Russell's happiness paradox 87
the human animal, like others, is adapted to a certain amount of struggle for life, and when by means of great wealth homo sapiens can gratify all his whims without effort, the mere absence of effort from his life removes an essential element of happiness. The man who acquires easily things for which he feels only a very modest desire concludes that the attainment of desires does not bring happiness. If he is of a philosophical disposition, he concludes that human life is essentially wretched, since the man who has all he wants is still unhappy. He forgets that to be without some of the things you want is an indispensable part of happiness. This Kenny interprets to mean that Russell is committed to saying that "I want to be without some of the things I want". But why so? Why such a strong claim? If we must leap into "first-person" talk, then is it not closer to the letter of the passage to say that Russell only seems to be committed to saying that "I want it to be that there is something I do not have but want to have"? In other words: to say that "there is something I want to have and want not to have" is neither necessarily nor (I believe) typically a contradiction, and still less so is Russell's more probable claim that "I want it to be that there is something I do not have but want to have."4 But suppose Russell really intended to say or actually said that "we should not want to satisfy all our wants". Even if this were true, it still doesn't follow that the sentence involves an inconsistency. For the word "want" could here be used in two different ways: in the active sense of "actually desiring" and, then, in the more passive sense of "having an ultimate interest". Thus Russell might be interpreted as saying that "to be without some of the things you have an ultimate interest in is an indispensable part of happiness." This interpretation lacks dash and generates a different set of problems, but it does seem to avoid the paradox.
Another, perhaps more plausible, solution is to distinguish between first-and second-order volitions and say something along the following lines. Not every want is a first-order one, that is, a desire to do or not to do one thing or another. There seem to be second-order wants, that is, wants which attempt to regulate first-order ones. For example, I may want to satisfy all my desires. But since I know that men suffer from boredom and that human welfare must include some degree of stimulation and challenge, and further know that happiness requires having important unrealized life ends, I also choose to be without some of the things I want. This may make life much more complex, and happiness (in the sense of satisfaction of desire) always beyond my reach, but it seems neither to involve an inconsistency nor to close the door on having a relatively successful and full life.
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